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Abstract We examine whether the type of political regime, regime changes, and economic
liberalization are related to economic growth accelerations. Our results show that growth ac-
celerations are preceded by economic liberalizations. We also find that growth accelerations
are less likely to happen the longer a political regime—be it a democracy or an autocracy—
has been in place, while (a move toward) more democracy according to the Polity IV dataset
reduces the likelihood of growth accelerations.
Keywords Economic growth accelerations · Political regime · Regime changes ·
Economic liberalization
JEL Classification O17 · O11
1 Introduction
Various studies have examined whether economic liberalization and the political regime in
place affect a country’s economic growth performance.1 However, evidence based on cross-
1For a survey of the relationship between economic growth and political regimes, see, e.g., Przeworski et al.
(2000). Winters (2004) provides an overview of the relationship between trade liberalization and economic
growth, while the literature on economic liberalization and economic growth is surveyed by De Haan et al.
(2006). A somewhat related contribution is Crain (2003).
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country growth regressions has been criticized for its limited ability to address causality
(Durlauf et al. 2005). Furthermore, cross-country growth regressions rely on very strong as-
sumptions about a single linear model being appropriate for all countries in all economic
conditions, while only few countries had constant growth rates over periods of several
decades (Pritchett 2000).2
Due to its fixation on long-run differences in growth, empirical research has underesti-
mated the importance of instability and volatility in growth rates, especially in developing
countries (De Haan 2007). The study by Pritchett (2000) was one of the first to identify that
instability in growth rates over time for a single country is great, relative to both the average
level of growth and the variance across countries. Jones and Olken (2008) report that no
less than 48 countries have experienced one or more structural breaks in their economic de-
velopment. These breaks led to very distinct growth patterns. Whereas some countries had
long periods of sustained growth, others faced rapid growth followed by stagnation or even
a period of crisis. Still, other countries faced continuous stagnation or steady decline.
One promising research strategy attempts using this diversity in growth patterns to ex-
amine whether economic, political, institutional, and policy conditions affect economic de-
velopment. Although still small, this line of research focusing on the time dimension of
economic growth is burgeoning rapidly. A good example is the study by Jones and Olken
(2005), who examine whether the death of national leaders due either to accident or natural
cause leads to a different growth rate. They find evidence that change of leadership matters,
notably so in autocratic regimes. Probably the best-known study of growth accelerations is
by Hausmann et al. (2005), who conclude that growth accelerations are often preceded by
political regime changes, while economic liberalization is hardly related to these accelera-
tions.
Following up on the research by Hausmann et al. (2005), we propose a new way to
identify so-called growth accelerations. Using data for 106 countries over the period 1957–
1993, we identify 89 of these growth accelerations and examine whether they are related
to the political regime in place, regime changes, or economic liberalization. Our results
show that economic growth accelerations are preceded by economic liberalization and not
by political regime changes. We also find that growth accelerations are less likely to happen
the longer a political regime—be it a democracy or an autocracy—has been in place, while
(a move toward) more democracy according to the Polity IV dataset reduces the likelihood
of growth accelerations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a brief discussion of previous studies,
outlining what may drive growth accelerations. Section 3 discusses our filter to identify eco-
nomic growth accelerations. Section 4 analyzes the relationship between political regime
changes, economic liberalization, and growth accelerations, while Sect. 5 examines the ro-
bustness of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 What drives growth accelerations?
Hausmann et al. (2005) look for growth accelerations during 1957–1992 and report many
such episodes even in countries that have under-performed during this period in terms of
average growth. These authors argue that growth accelerations can be triggered by favorable
2Various authors have therefore used panel models, but the periods chosen in panel models are often justified
only on the grounds that data were available at those frequencies or the researcher wanted to divide the whole
period into equal chunks (Pritchett 2000).
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external conditions and changes in the underlying political balance as revealed by trans-
formations in the political regime. Likewise, economic liberalization may be conducive to
growth accelerations. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that economic liberalization stim-
ulates long-term growth (Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005), so it is also likely that growth ac-
celerations may be affected by economic liberalization. Hausmann et al. (2005) find that
growth accelerations are often preceded by political regime changes, while economic lib-
eralization is hardly related to these accelerations.3 Imam and Salinas (2008) report for a
group of 22 Western African economies for the period 1960–2006 that growth accelerations
are most clearly associated with external shocks, economic liberalization, political stability,
and closeness to the coast. Timmer and De Vries (2009) find that growth accelerations are
explained by productivity increases within sectors, but not by reallocation of employment
to more productive sectors. They base their findings on the Groningen Growth and Devel-
opment Center (GGDC) database, which consists of annual time series of value added and
persons employed for the ten main sectors of the economy and includes 19 countries in Asia
and Latin America in the period from 1950 to 2005.
Here, we focus once more on the aggregate economy. We will not only examine whether
political regime changes and economic liberalization affect the likelihood of growth accel-
erations, but also investigate whether the political regime matters. There is an extensive
literature on the effect of democracy on economic growth (see, for instance, Tavares and
Wacziarg 2001) based on cross-country or panel methods, but authors often come to differ-
ent conclusions. One reason could be that democracy may have both positive and negative
implications for growth. On the positive side, transparency and accountability may enhance
economic performance. On the negative side, the consensus required by democratic institu-
tions may delay responses to shocks and implementation of legislation. Doucouliagos and
Ulubasoglu (2008) conclude on the basis of a meta-analysis that there is no clear evidence
of democracy being detrimental to economic growth. The accumulated evidence points to a
zero direct effect on economic growth.
Some recent studies focus on the time-series dimension of growth and examine whether
growth accelerations are related to the political system in place. Jerzmanowski (2006)
reports that democracy lowers the propensity for crises but also limits the frequency of
episodes of very rapid growth, while Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2008) report that democ-
racy is the most robust predictor of a country’s propensity for growth reversals.
However Clague et al. (1996) argue that it is not (the lack of) democratic rights that affect
economic growth but the length of time that a particular regime has been in place, no mat-
ter whether the regime is democratic or autocratic. An autocrat expecting to rule for a long
time would gain from respecting the property rights of individuals, in contrast to an auto-
crat with a short-term horizon, who will gain from expropriating the wealth of his subjects.
Also, transitory democracies can easily suffer from expropriations that have the same harm-
ful effects as the predations of an autocrat. In a lasting democracy, however, the situation
“is utterly different not only from transitory democracies but also from autocratic govern-
ments. Though lasting democracies suffer from sclerotic accumulations of special-interest
lobbying and (like all other types of governments) often have economically inefficient poli-
cies, they necessarily hold elections under law and the governmental leaders or parties that
3However, Jong-A-Pin and De Haan (2008) show that these conclusions are wrong as Hausmann et al. were
led astray by a data-description error in the Polity IV manual. When they correct for the error, Jong-A-Pin
and De Haan find that political regime changes are not related to the probability that growth accelerations
occur.
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are defeated surrender power in accord with the law. There cannot be genuine elections un-
less even the leading opponents of the party in power have not only political rights but also
the economic rights needed to obtain a livelihood.” (Clague et al. 1996: 245). In an earlier
work, Olsen (1982) stressed that a government that is in power for a long time will form a
distributional coalition that will have incentives to influence policies in its favor. Since the
benefits of these policies are concentrated among the coalition members while the costs are
diffused throughout the whole population, they will face little public resistance. Over time,
distributional coalitions accumulate and the nation burdened by them will fall into economic
decline (Imam and Salinas 2008).
The importance of regime duration for economic growth is also stressed by studies on
the relation between political instability and economic growth. Jong-A-Pin (2009) shows
that countries with a stable political regime grow on average faster than countries without
a stable political regime. On the other hand, Jong-A-Pin and Yu (2010) find that within
politically unstable countries a leadership change accelerates economic growth—especially
in the poorest counties. Hence, also from this point of view, the direction of the relation
between regime duration and growth accelerations is not clear a priori. In our empirical
analysis, we will also test whether the duration of a regime affects the likelihood that growth
accelerations occur.
3 Identifying growth accelerations
To identify growth accelerations, we propose a simple criterion that first identifies all pos-
sible take-offs of growth accelerations. This criterion is similar to the so-called BBQ rule
used to identify turning points in business cycles (Harding and Pagan 2002). To qualify as
the potential start of any growth acceleration in year t , economic growth (g) in the first year
of the acceleration should be higher than in the year before: 4
gt+1 > gt .
If year t satisfies this criterion, we check whether it also fulfills the three criteria proposed
by Hausmann et al. (2005):
gt,n+7 > 3.5 ppa,
gt,n+7 − gt−7,t > 2.0 ppa
yt+7 > max{yi}, i ≤ t,
where ppa is percent per annum. That is, to qualify as growth acceleration, the growth rate
over an 8-year period must be at least 3.5% per annum. Furthermore, it must be at least two
percentage points higher than in the previous 8 years. Finally, to rule out episodes of full
economic recovery, the level of real GDP (y) must be higher at the end of the acceleration
than in all years before the acceleration. If these criteria are satisfied as well and year t − 1
and year t + 1 do not qualify, we identify year t as the start of the growth acceleration.
If consecutive years fulfill all criteria, we take the year in which the level of real GDP is
minimal to be the starting point of the growth acceleration.
4In our robustness analysis, we also examine the criterion that the 2-year growth rate should exceed the 2-
year growth rate before the start of the growth acceleration. This alternative criterion ensures that economic
growth not only accelerates, but also that the growth rate at the start of the acceleration is substantial.
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Fig. 1 Growth accelerations in
Chile
To exemplify our approach as well as the difference with the filter of Hausmann et al.
(2005), consider the development of income per capita in Chile as illustrated in Fig. 1. The
figure shows that after a long period of modest economic growth, there has been a rapid
acceleration in economic growth at the beginning of the 1980s. According to our filter, 1983
qualifies as the start of the acceleration. In that year, economic growth was higher than in
the year before (5% versus −5%), the average growth rate per annum over the 8-year period
was 4.2% per annum, and the difference between the 8-year growth rate after the start of
the acceleration and the 8-year period before the acceleration is 2.5 percentage points. The
figure also shows that the level of GDP per capita at the end of the acceleration exceeded the
level at the start of the acceleration. As there is no earlier year that also meets all conditions,
1983 is taken as the start of the growth acceleration. Our filter identifies perfectly the trough
after which economic growth takes of. In contrast, the filter of Hausmann et al. (2005)
identifies 1986 as the start of the growth acceleration, i.e., the year in which their filter
detects a structural break in the time series. Whereas both filters may seem reasonable,
the filter of Hausmann et al. (2005) exhibits some counterintuitive features. For instance,
according to their filter, 27 growth accelerations have a higher economic growth rate in the
year before the acceleration than at the start of the acceleration. In the Appendix, we discuss
this issue further. Since we are interested in the determinants that cause the start of a growth
acceleration, we argue that our filter is more appropriate for our empirical analysis than the
filter of Hausmann et al. (2005).
Using Penn World Table Data (Heston et al. 2002), our filter identifies 89 accelerations,
which are reported in Table 1. We checked how sensitive our findings are with respect to
these criteria and it turned out that the accelerations that we identify are not very sensitive
to reasonable changes in these criteria.5
As Table 1 shows, accelerations occur quite frequently in Africa, a continent normally
not associated with high rates of economic growth. Figure 2 shows the average number of
growth accelerations per year for the entire sample period. It can be seen that there is a de-
creasing trend over time. Nowadays, the likelihood of observing accelerations in economic
growth is lower than in the period before 1970.
5More specifically, we tightened and relaxed our threshold values between 3–4% per annum for the first
restriction and between 1.5–2.5% per annum for the second restriction. In the robustness analysis in Sect. 5,
we show estimation results when these alternative restrictions are used.
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Table 1 Growth accelerations according to our filter
Country Year Growth Growth Difference Post crisis
before during in growth acceleration
acceleration acceleration rate
Algeria 1975 2.14 4.20 2.06 0
Argentina 1963 0.90 3.60 2.70 0
Argentina 1990 −3.10 6.10 9.20 1
Australia 1961 1.55 3.80 2.25 0
Belgium 1958 2.37 4.70 2.33 0
Botswana 1970 3.33 11.40 8.07 0
Brazil 1966 3.12 7.20 4.08 0
Cameroon 1972 −0.58 5.30 5.88 0
Canada 1961 0.97 3.80 2.83 0
Chad 1974 −1.48 7.30 8.78 1
Chile 1983 1.69 4.20 2.51 1
Chile 1988 0.98 5.80 4.82 0
China 1976 1.95 5.30 3.35 0
China 1981 3.54 6.50 2.96 0
China 1989 5.19 8.70 3.51 0
Colombia 1967 1.56 4.00 2.44 0
Congo, Republic of 1969 0.91 5.40 4.49 0
Congo, Republic of 1977 3.75 8.70 4.95 0
Denmark 1958 2.24 5.20 2.96 0
Dominican Republic 1968 −0.17 6.50 6.67 0
Dominican Republic 1991 0.43 5.80 5.37 0
Ecuador 1966 1.28 4.60 3.32 0
Ecuador 1971 1.63 7.70 6.07 0
Egypt 1975 −1.14 5.50 6.64 1
Finland 1958 2.72 5.00 2.28 0
Finland 1968 2.84 5.30 2.46 0
Finland 1993 −0.41 4.40 4.81 0
Ghana 1963 −0.21 3.80 4.01 0
Guinea-Bissau 1971 −5.46 10.00 15.46 1
Guinea-Bissau 1989 −0.04 5.70 5.74 0
Haiti 1989 −2.29 9.30 11.59 0
India 1982 1.47 3.90 2.43 0
Indonesia 1967 −0.76 5.50 6.26 0
Indonesia 1987 3.41 5.50 2.09 0
Iran 1991 −1.53 4.60 6.13 0
Ireland 1958 1.04 3.70 2.66 0
Ireland 1986 1.45 4.90 3.45 0
Ireland 1993 4.95 8.20 3.25 0
Israel 1958 2.43 5.40 2.97 0
Israel 1967 2.78 7.20 4.42 1
Japan 1958 5.77 9.00 3.23 0
Jordan 1971 −3.13 6.00 9.13 1
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Table 1 (Continued)
Country Year Growth Growth Difference Post crisis
before during in growth acceleration
acceleration acceleration rate
Kenya 1968 2.57 4.60 2.03 0
Korea, Republic of 1960 1.93 4.90 2.97 0
Korea, Republic of 1967 4.94 7.10 2.16 0
Korea, Republic of 1981 5.50 7.80 2.30 0
Lesotho 1969 1.72 3.90 2.18 0
Malawi 1970 1.45 3.90 2.45 0
Malawi 1992 −0.79 4.80 5.59 0
Malaysia 1971 2.96 5.00 2.04 0
Malaysia 1986 2.28 5.50 3.22 0
Mali 1993 0.16 3.70 3.54 0
Mauritius 1969 −1.49 4.70 6.19 0
Mauritius 1983 1.01 5.50 4.49 0
Morocco 1960 −0.92 5.50 6.42 0
Nicaragua 1959 1.14 5.20 4.06 0
Nigeria 1967 −1.72 7.30 9.02 1
Norway 1991 1.42 3.60 2.18 0
Pakistan 1960 −1.76 4.30 6.06 1
Pakistan 1977 1.64 4.40 2.76 0
Panama 1959 1.46 5.40 3.94 0
Panama 1976 1.93 5.30 3.37 0
Paraguay 1973 2.65 5.90 3.25 0
Peru 1959 0.85 5.20 4.35 1
Peru 1990 −2.18 4.00 6.18 1
Poland 1991 0.50 4.80 4.30 1
Portugal 1984 1.58 5.60 4.02 0
Romania 1980 0.65 14.50 13.85 1
Rwanda 1975 0.73 4.00 3.27 0
Singapore 1967 7.00 10.60 3.60 0
Spain 1959 4.45 8.00 3.55 0
Spain 1984 0.11 3.80 3.69 0
Sri Lanka 1979 1.86 4.10 2.24 0
Syria 1968 1.40 4.30 2.90 0
Syria 1974 2.63 4.80 2.17 0
Syria 1989 −2.89 4.40 7.29 0
Taiwan 1960 3.32 6.80 3.48 0
Taiwan 1966 6.12 8.60 2.48 0
Thailand 1958 −0.88 5.40 6.28 0
Thailand 1983 4.27 6.60 2.33 0
Trinidad &Tobago 1971 2.07 4.80 2.73 1
Tunisia 1969 2.55 6.40 3.85 0
Tunisia 1993 1.57 3.70 2.13 0
Uganda 1989 −0.80 3.60 4.40 0
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Table 1 (Continued)
Country Year Growth Growth Difference Post crisis
before during in growth acceleration
acceleration acceleration rate
United Kingdom 1982 1.07 3.50 2.43 0
United States 1961 0.90 3.90 3.00 0
Uruguay 1974 1.46 4.00 2.54 0
Zimbabwe 1963 0.21 6.60 6.39 0
Zimbabwe 1968 3.53 6.50 2.97 0
Notes: column (1) indicates the start of the acceleration; column (2) shows the rate of growth in the 8 years
preceding the acceleration; column (3) presents the average growth rate during the episode; column (4)
presents the difference between column (2) and (3)
Fig. 2 Growth accelerations over time, 1957–1993. Note: the figure shows the number of growth accelera-
tions per year
4 Empirical analysis
We examine whether particular variables trigger growth accelerations. Our dependent vari-
able takes a value of one centered on the timing of the start of a growth acceleration and
zero otherwise.6 Our dataset consists of 106 countries over the period 1957–1993 of which
60 countries experienced one or more growth accelerations.
Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Hausmann et al. (2005) and Imam and Salinas
(2008), we rely on the index provided by Sachs and Warner (1995) as updated and im-
6So in case of an acceleration starting in year t , the year t − 1, and t + 1 also are assigned the value one. See
also Hausmann et al. (2005).
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proved upon by Wacziarg and Welch (2008) as our proxy for economic liberalization. This
index incorporates a number of structural features (e.g., presence of marketing boards and
socialist economic regimes) and the macroeconomic environment (e.g., presence of a large
black-market premium for foreign currency), in addition to tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade. The variable included is a dummy that takes the value of 1 during the first 5 years
after the country liberalized its markets.7 The main advantage of this proxy for economic
liberalization is that it is available on a yearly basis, although it is mainly trade oriented.
As an alternative, we also use the change in the level of economic freedom (obtained from
Gwartney and Lawson 2008) to proxy economic liberalization.8
Our regime change variable is taken from the Polity IV dataset of Marshall and Jaggers
(2002). In line with the Polity IV manual, a regime change is defined as a three points
change in the Polity score in 3 years or less. However, as it is possible that a country has
no formal regime for several years, we focus only on those changes, which are followed
by a continuation of the same regime for at least one year. Like the economic liberalization
dummy, we use a dummy equal to one for the first 5 years after a political regime change and
zero otherwise. We differentiate between positive regime changes (i.e., more democracy)
and negative regime changes (i.e., more autocracy). In addition, we include the Polity score
itself as an explanatory variable to proxy the level of democracy. Finally, we add the duration
of a regime defined as the number of years that the current regime is in place, as suggested
by Clague et al. (1996).
We decide on the appropriate panel data model using the test proposed by Hausman
(1978). The null-hypothesis is that all country fixed effects equal zero. Using the estimates of
a conditional fixed effects logit (CFEL) model (see Chamberlain 1980) and the unrestricted
(pooled) logit model, this hypothesis is rejected according to the Hausman test for all model
specifications. Hence, CFEL should be preferred.9 Furthermore, we examine the presence
of time effects in the data. As Fig. 2 suggests that the number of growth accelerations is
steadily decreasing over time, we include a linear trend in our model, which turns out to be
significant in almost all specifications.10
Table 2 contains the estimation results. The results reported in columns (1)–(7) are based
on the full sample, while columns (8)–(14) exclude those episodes that started just after an
economic crisis. As it seems likely that economic growth picks up after a crisis, we want to
make sure that our results are not driven by the inclusion of this kind of ‘economic recovery’
acceleration.11 In case the growth rate in the 2 years before the growth acceleration is smaller
7Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) have criticized this measure. They argue that some criteria, like black market
premiums and export marketing boards, disproportionally determine the outcome of a country being open or
closed. Wacziarg and Welch (2008) acknowledge this limitation in the case of their cross-sectional openness
measure, but also show that this critique does not hold for the dating of trade liberalization. In our analysis,
we only focus on the latter as we are interested only in the timing of trade liberalization.
8Although this measure might be a better proxy for economic liberalization, it is available only on at five-year
intervals for a sub-period of our sample thereby severely limiting the available observations in our analysis.
9As a robustness check, we also estimated our models using a linear probability model with fixed effects. It
turns out that the results are very similar to the conditional fixed effects logit results. The results are available
on request.
10We also considered the inclusion of time effects in our model as growth accelerations might be triggered by,
for instance, world economic growth. However, F-tests examining the hypothesis that all time effects equal 0
could not be rejected for most specifications. Besides, the inclusion of a linear trend consumes less degrees
of freedom.
11See, for example, Fig. 1 in which we illustrate the case of Chile. There, the first acceleration followed a
period in which income per capita dropped substantially (16%). There are 14 accelerations that have started
after an economic crisis. They are indicated in column 5 of Table 1.
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Table 2 Estimation results: base model
Dependent variable: growth a Including post-crisis periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Time trend −0.061 −0.049 −0.046 −0.036 −0.032 −0.030 −0.027
(7.23)*** (5.46)*** (4.88)*** (3.62)*** (3.14)*** (2.81)*** (2.45)***
Economic reform 1.004 0.897 0.887 0.877 0.870 0.820 0.815
(3.88)*** (3.46)*** (3.40)*** (3.37)*** (3.30)*** (3.12)*** (3.10)***
Regime change −0.006 −0.408 −0.789
(0.02) (1.58) (2.91)***
Positive regime change −1.162 −1.556
(3.37)*** (4.21)***
Negative regime change 0.326 0.035
(1.06) (0.10)
Regime duration −0.031 −0.040 −0.048 −0.065 −0.064 −0.068
(3.05)*** (3.43)*** (4.04)*** (4.83)*** (4.71)*** (4.83)***
Democracy −0.050 −0.003 −0.014
(2.27)** (0.10) (0.50)
Regtrans = −2 −0.021
(0.06)
Regtrans = −1 0.223
(0.28)
Regtrans = 1 −2.034
(3.06)***
Regtrans = 2 −0.806
(0.97)
Regtrans = 3 −1.469
(3.31)***
Observations 1235 1239 1235 1235 1205 1205 1209
Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12
than −10%, we define it as post-crisis growth acceleration.12 It can be immediately observed
that the results for the two samples are very similar.
In all regressions, the economic liberalization variable is always included. In contrast to
the results reported by Hausmann et al. (2005), we find that the effect of economic liberal-
ization on the probability for growth accelerations is highly significant in all specifications.
In columns (2)–(7) and (9)–(14), regime duration is added. This variable also is always sig-
nificant. The longer a regime has been in place, the less likely growth accelerations will
occur.
However, the results for political regime changes are less clear. In columns (1) and (8),
the coefficient of the political regime changes variable is not significantly different from
12Using a threshold of −5%, we find 13 additional post crisis growth accelerations. If a threshold of −15%
is used, we find only four such episodes.
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Table 2 (Continued)
Excluding post crisis periods
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Time trend −0.061 −0.044 −0.041 −0.029 −0.023 −0.020 −0.013
(6.55)*** (4.43)*** (3.97)*** (2.59)*** (1.92)* (1.62) (1.02)
Economic reform 1.175 1.025 1.026 1.002 1.024 0.968 0.946
(4.16)*** (3.60)*** (3.59)*** (3.51)*** (3.54)*** (3.36)*** (3.27)***
Regime change 0.208 −0.330 −0.696
(0.80) (1.17) (2.39)**
Positive regime change −1.159 −1.453
(3.10)*** (3.68)***
Negative regime change 0.490 0.121
(1.45) (0.31)
Regime duration −0.044 −0.051 −0.061 −0.083 −0.082 −0.090
(3.80)*** (3.88)*** (4.54)*** (5.34)*** (5.20)*** (5.45)***
Democracy −0.072 −0.026 −0.045
(2.88)*** (0.86) (1.43)
Regtrans = −2 0.042
(0.10)
Regtrans = −1 0.189
(0.24)
Regtrans = 1 −2.111
(2.98)***
Regtrans = 2 −0.096
(0.11)
Regtrans = 3 −1.409
(2.97)***
Observations 1070 1073 1070 1070 1045 1045 1048
Countries 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at
1%
zero.13 However, columns (4) and (11) suggest that positive regime changes do matter, i.e.,
a move toward democracy reduces the likelihood of a growth acceleration.
To examine the effect of democracy further, we add in columns (5)–(7) and (12)–(14) our
democracy variable as explanatory variable. Its coefficient is always negative, i.e., growth
accelerations are more likely under autocracy, while in columns (5) and (12) its coefficient is
13Our method to identify political regime changes is fully in line with the approach suggested by Hausmann
et al. (2005). However, as Jong-A-Pin and De Haan (2008) pointed out, Hausmann et al. (2005) made a
serious mistake in coding regime changes. Jong-A-Pin and De Haan (2008) use the filter as proposed by
Hausmann et al. (2005) to identify growth accelerations and they also find that political regime changes are
not related to growth accelerations. So, our different findings with respect to the impact of regime changes on
growth accelerations are not caused by the use of our proposed filter.
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significantly different from zero. If we add positive and negative regime changes (columns
(6) and (13)), the democracy variable becomes insignificant, but positive regime changes
remain significant with a negative coefficient. In columns (7) and (14), we disaggregate the
regime changes in five categories, using the Polity IV variable Regtrans. If Regtrans = 3,
there is a six points or greater increase in the Polity score over a period of 3 years or less. If
Regtrans = 2, there is a three to five point increase in the Polity score over a period of 3 years
or less. If Regtrans = 1, there is a three or more point increase in the Polity score without a
shift in regime type, while a score of −1 indicates a three or more point decrease in the Polity
score. A value of −2 indicates a six or more points decrease in the Polity score. In line with
our previous findings, it turns out that the coefficients of variables reflecting positive regime
changes are negative and significant (except for Regtrans = 2, which probably reflects that
there are only a few observations for this variable). If post-crisis periods are excluded, the
democracy variable also becomes significant (column 14). So all this evidence suggests that
(a move towards) more democracy reduces the likelihood of economic growth accelerations.
5 Robustness analysis
To check the robustness of our results, we run several variants of our base model. The results
are reported in Table 3 and Table 4. Again, we show results for the full sample (Table 3) and
for the sample in which episodes started just after an economic crisis are exluded (Table 4).
First, we replace the regime change variable by two alternative indicators based on the
work of Przeworski et al. (2000) and Vanhanen (2000). We define a regime change if these
authors indicate that a regime switches from democracy to autocracy and vice versa. In
the full sample, both regime change variables are hardly significant. Only when we use
the Przeworski regime change variable do we find that negative regime changes increase
the probability that growth will accelerate. If we exclude the post-crisis periods, the results
become more pronounced. For both regime change variables, we find that changes toward
more autocracy increase the probability of a growth acceleration.
Second, we add several control variables to the base model as suggested by Hausmann
et al. (2005). In column (5) of Tables 3 and 4, we add a dummy for financial liberaliza-
tion, while in column (6) we incorporate terms of trade. Unfortunately, the use of additional
control variables decreases the sample size. It can be seen that adding the terms of trade
variable or the financial liberalization measure affects the result for the economic liberaliza-
tion variable, which becomes insignificant or less significant in the full sample. This result
could be driven by the fact that a number of countries drop from the sample all of which
had experienced economic liberalization just before a growth acceleration.14 When we in-
clude variables that capture characteristics of the political environment such as the death
of a political leader and its interaction15 with the tenure of the political leader (following
Jones and Olken (2008); results are in column (7) of Tables 3 and 4), or the end of a (civil)
war (column (8) of Tables 3 and 4), we obtain the same results as in the base model. Eco-
nomic liberalization, the duration of the regime, and (a move toward) more democracy all
significantly affect the likelihood of growth accelerations.
14This happened in Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, South-Korea, Morocco, Poland, Tunisia, Taiwan, and Uganda.
15Note that the constitutive term of the tenure of the political leader cannot be included in the model because
of perfect collinearity with the interaction term. As Brambor et al. (2006) point out omitting the constitutive
term may bias the estimates.
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Third, we run several regressions using alternative restrictions on our filter to identify
growth accelerations. As a benchmark, we use specification 5 of Table 2. In column (1)
of Table 5, we increase the requirement of rapid growth to 4 ppa, while we decrease it to
3 ppa in column (2). Alternatively, in columns (3) and (4), we change the requirement that
economic growth increases relative to the previous period to 2.5 ppa and 1.5 ppa, respec-
tively. In column (5), we impose the condition that economic growth at the beginning of
the acceleration should be substantial. That is, we require that economic growth during the
first 2 years of the growth acceleration exceeds economic growth in the 2 years before the
start of the acceleration. In column (6), we focus again on growth accelerations that are not
preceded by a period of economic crisis. However, here we use a milder restriction and only
focus on those cases that are not preceded by a 2-year period in which economic growth was
lower than 5%.
Finally, we provide two more robustness checks. In column (7) of Table 5, we exclude all
East Asian countries from our sample to check whether our results are driven by the “East
Asian Miracle” countries. Finally, we replace our economic liberalization indicator by the
first difference of the economic freedom index of Gwartney and Lawson (2008). This index
is available only from 1970 onward on a 5-year interval causing a large drop in the number
of observations that can be analyzed. To implement this index in our model and to cope with
the scattered availability of data, we estimate a pooled logit model. More specifically, we
examine whether economic growth accelerations are preceded by increases in the economic
freedom index in the 5-year interval in the preceding 5-year period to minimize endogene-
ity problems. For example, Chile’s first acceleration started in 1983. Hence, we examine
whether this acceleration was preceded by an increase in economic freedom in the period
1975–1979.
All results presented in Table 5 show that our estimation results are, in general, robust to
the alternative specifications as described above.
6 Concluding comments
Due to the fixation on long-run differences in growth, empirical research on economic
growth has underestimated the importance of instability and volatility in growth rates, es-
pecially in developing countries. Traditional cross-country and panel growth models are not
well suited for using information provided by the time dimension. Periods chosen in panel
models are often justified only on the grounds that data were available at those frequencies
or the researcher wanted to divide the whole period into equal chunks. These periods are
unlikely to tease out information provided by the development of variables over time. If, for
instance, there is a high growth rate in the first 5 years and a low growth rate in the second
half of the 10-year period, the period average will be rather uninformative (De Haan 2007).
The approach suggested by Hausmann et al. (2005) uses the information provided by the
time dimension, focusing on turning points in growth performance, and examining instances
of rapid acceleration in economic growth that are sustained. Building upon that seminal
work, we make various contributions. First, we improve upon the filter used by Hausmann
et al. to identify growth accelerations. Even though we focus on the same sample as used by
Hausmann et al. (2005), there are substantial differences between accelerations identified
by their our filter and ours. Second, we test for country fixed effects and, based on the
testing outcomes, use conditional fixed effects logistic regressions instead of (pooled) probit
regressions. Third, we do not focus only on economic liberalization and (the direction of)
regime changes, but also examine the role of the regime in place and its duration. Finally, we
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investigate the robustness of our results using alternative regime and economic liberalization
indicators.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that economic growth accelerations
are preceded by economic liberalization. This result does not depend on the use of the
Sachs/Warner/Wacziarg/Welch indicator of economic liberalization: this result also holds
when we use the change in the Economic Freedom indicator of Gwartney and Lawson
(2008). Second, we find that political regimes changes in general do not precede growth
accelerations. However, our results show that regime changes toward more democracy (ac-
cording to Polity IV) reduce the likelihood of a growth acceleration. These results stand in
contrast to the findings of Hausmann et al. (2005). As we have shown earlier (see Jong-A-
Pin and De Haan 2008), part of the difference in our results can be explained by the fact that
Hausmann et al. were led astray by a coding error in the way they constructed their indicator
of political regime change. However, our improved filter and empirical model make our find-
ings concerning the negative impact of changes toward more democracy and economic liber-
alization more pronounced. We also find that growth accelerations are less likely to happen
the longer a political regime—be it a democracy or an autocracy—has been in place. This
finding is in line with Olson’s (1982) sclerosis view of government. Although this finding
is in contrast with the notion that political instability is, on average, detrimental to growth,
it is in line with recent findings that a single leadership (or regime) change may be a nec-
essary condition for a country to start a period of economic growth (Jones and Olken 2005;
Jong-A-Pin and Yu 2010).
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Appendix: A comparison with the filter of Hausmann et al. (2005)
We use the same GDP data as Hausmann et al. (2005), so that differences in dating growth
accelerations are not caused by the use of different data sets. Table 6 reports the growth rate
before the start of the growth accelerations identified by Hausmann et al. (2005), the growth
rate in the first year of the acceleration and the 8-year growth average according to data from
the Penn World Tables 6.1.
Table 6 shows that 18 growth acceleration episodes as identified by Hausmann et al. have
a negative growth rate in the first year of the acceleration. Furthermore, 27 of the identified
episodes have a higher growth rate in the year before the acceleration than at the start of
the acceleration. Finally, in 10 episodes, growth in the year before the acceleration is higher
than the average growth rate during the entire acceleration. On the basis of these figures,
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Table 6 Growth accelerations according to Hausmann et al. (2005)
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Growth in Growth in Average Growth Growth Growth
year before first year of growth before > before > at start
acceleration acceleration during growth at growth <0?
acceleration start? during?
Algeria 1975 1.6 10.7 4.2 n n n
Argentina 1963 −6.1 7.7 3.6 n n n
Argentina 1990 −6.0 9.8 6.1 n n n
Australia 1961 −1.7 4.8 3.8 n n n
Belgium 1959 3.8 5.4 4.5 n n n
Botswana 1969 5.1 −5.1 11.7 y n y
Brazil 1967 2.5 8.4 7.8 n n n
Canada 1962 5.1 3.4 3.6 y y n
Chad 1973 −8.3 −4.6 7.3 n n y
Chile 1986 3.1 3.7 5.5 n n n
China 1978 −1.1 10.6 6.7 n n n
China 1990 7.0 10.6 8.0 n n n
Colombia 1967 0.8 2.9 4.0 n n n
Comoros 1972 −2.8 0.6 5.3 n n n
Congo Rep. 1969 9.0 12.2 5.4 n y n
Congo Rep. 1978 7.9 13.7 8.2 n n n
Denmark 1957 4.0 0.5 5.3 y n n
Dominican Rep. 1969 5.4 13.3 5.5 n n n
Dominican Rep. 1992 4.2 3.8 6.3 y n n
Ecuador 1970 4.2 2.9 8.4 y n n
Egypt 1976 10.3 9.8 4.7 y y n
Finland 1958 −2.1 7.1 5.0 n n n
Finland 1967 1.3 0.6 5.6 y n n
Finland 1992 −7.8 −4.3 2.8 n n y
Ghana 1965 −21.7 22.7 8.3 n n n
Guinea-Bissau 1969 −1.7 −27.8 8.1 y n y
Guinea-Bissau 1988 −5.4 −1.6 5.2 n n y
Haiti 1990 1.9 11.6 12.7 n n n
India 1982 3.2 5.3 3.9 n n n
Indonesia 1967 −1.6 9.4 5.5 n n n
Indonesia 1987 2.5 4.0 5.5 n n n
Ireland 1958 0.0 4.8 3.7 n n n
Ireland 1985 2.5 −0.6 5.0 y n y
Israel 1957 3.6 3.2 5.3 y n n
Israel 1967 −6.0 17.2 7.2 n n n
Japan 1958 3.4 8.4 9.0 n n n
Jordan 1973 −1.5 −1.7 9.1 y n y
Rep. Korea 1962 −0.4 8.9 6.9 n n n
Rep. Korea 1984 7.2 5.3 8.0 y n n
Lesotho 1971 3.4 −0.6 5.3 y n y
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Table 6 (Continued)
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Growth in Growth in Average Growth Growth Growth
year before first year of growth before > before > at start
acceleration acceleration during growth at growth <0?
acceleration start? during?
Malawi 1970 −9.1 21.8 3.9 n n n
Malawi 1992 −10.3 12.8 4.8 n n n
Malaysia 1970 3.3 3.2 5.1 y n n
Malaysia 1988 6.2 6.4 5.7 n y n
Mali 1972 2.8 −3.6 3.8 y n y
Mauritius 1971 −0.5 4.4 6.7 n n n
Mauritius 1983 −0.2 2.6 5.5 n n n
Morocco 1958 5.4 1.3 7.7 y n n
New Zealand 1957 3.4 −1.3 3.8 y n y
Nicaragua 1960 6.3 3.6 4.8 y y n
Nigeria 1957 −0.6 4.2 4.3 n n n
Nigeria 1967 −17.8 −3.2 7.3 n n y
Norway 1991 2.5 2.5 3.7 n n n
Pakistan 1962 1.7 4.0 4.8 n n n
Pakistan 1979 −1.7 7.3 4.6 n n n
Panama 1959 −0.7 9.7 5.4 n n n
Panama 1975 1.2 −0.6 5.3 y n y
Papua New Guinea 1987 0.0 −4.1 4.0 y n y
Paraguay 1974 3.9 4.3 6.2 n n n
Peru 1959 −6.0 10.6 5.2 n n n
Poland 1992 1.9 3.5 5.0 n n n
Portugal 1985 2.7 4.3 5.4 n n n
Romania 1979 6.5 −2.1 12.4 y n y
Rwanda 1975 −2.1 15.1 4.0 n n n
Singapore 1969 12.5 12.3 8.2 y y n
Spain 1959 −4.5 8.2 8.0 n n n
Spain 1984 0.7 1.0 3.8 n n n
Sri Lanka 1979 0.5 1.1 4.1 n n n
Syria 1969 11.4 −19.2 5.8 y y y
Syria 1974 5.2 17.1 4.8 n y n
Syria 1989 −10.0 6.3 4.4 n n n
Taiwan 1961 4.0 4.6 7.1 n n n
Thailand 1957 10.9 −0.6 5.3 y y y
Thailand 1986 3.0 7.2 8.1 n n n
Trinidad &Tobago 1975 1.4 8.5 5.4 n n n
Tunisia 1968 9.7 4.7 6.6 y y n
Uganda 1977 −0.8 −6.3 4.0 y n y
Uganda 1989 1.3 5.2 3.6 n n n
United Kingdom 1982 2.4 3.8 3.5 n n n
United States 1961 0.4 4.7 3.9 n n n
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Table 6 (Continued)
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Growth in Growth in Average Growth Growth Growth
year before first year of growth before > before > at start
acceleration acceleration during growth at growth <0?
acceleration start? during?
Uruguay 1974 1.8 5.0 4.0 n n n
Uruguay 1989 0.1 −0.9 3.8 y n y
Zimbabwe 1964 5.6 10.1 7.2 n n n
Notes: column (1) indicates the start of the acceleration; column (2) shows the rate of growth in the year
preceding the acceleration; column (3) contains the growth rate at the start of the acceleration; column (4)
presents the average growth rate during the episode; column (5) indicates whether the growth before the start
of the acceleration exceeds the growth rate at the start of the episode (y = yes; n = no); column (6) indicates
whether the growth before the start of the acceleration exceeds the average growth rate of the episode; and
column (7) shows whether there is a negative growth rate at the start of the episode
it seems that episodes falling in the first category are identified too early, while episodes
falling in the latter categories are identified too late.16,17
There are substantial differences between accelerations based on the filter of Hausmann
et al. (2005) and those based on our filter. Only 28 episodes (33%) are identified at exactly
the same date, 31 episodes (37%) differ one year, while 15 episodes (18%) are identified
with a difference of more than one year. Furthermore, our filter does not pick up 9 episodes,
which are identified by the filter of Hausmann et al. (2005) as these episodes do not fulfill
the condition that the growth rate at the first year of the acceleration should be larger than
the growth rate in the year before the acceleration.18 Finally, we identify 10 episodes not
found by Hausmann et al. (2005).
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